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Summary  findings
Bank owner contingent liability has been important  in  *  The transfer of ownership claims in private and
the development of many industrial countries. Unlimited  provincial banks required that ownership first be
liabilitv on banik owners was an important element in the  dissolved before a new bank could he formed. This
success  of Scottish banking, for example, and lasted until  allowed the transfer of control to be mionitored,
1862, when banks were allowed to adopt a limited  minimizing adverse selection problems that mighit  arise
liability designation. As a result, Scotland was relatively  should ownership be transferred  to people with less
free of the hanking and monetary upheavals that  personal wealth.
occurred in Britain and the United States.  A contingent liability system has three advantages:
The unlimited liability provision effectively minimized  *  Because double liability imposes postclosure losses
the losses suffered by bank noteholders and other  on bank stockholders, it increases incentives for banks to
creditors. Actual losses from Scottish bank failures were  hold capital and decreases moral hazard incentives, suCh
well below those suffered by bank creditors in England.  as a "go-for-broke" strategy.
And Scottish banks were not prone to the bank runs and  *  A contingent liability system can ameliorate
contagion effects typical of British and U.S. banks at the  asymmetric informationl problems between bank
time. Scottishi  noteholders apparently had little incentive  creditors and owners.
to "run"  because of the effective coverage provided by  *  Contingent  liability can lead to more efficient
unlinmited  liability.  capital formation if potential capital sources are
lThree  factors were vital to the success of unlimited  predominantly  in the form of fixed wealth, as is true in
liability in Scotland:  many developing countries.
* The identities of batik owners were made publicly  But a free-rider problem arises when less-wealthy
available, and their level of wealth could be verified. So  stockholders rely on the monitoring efforts of wealthier
the degree of noteholder  protection from liability could  stockholders, who have more incentive to monitor. And
be assessed by adding up an owner's wealth.  in a free and anonymous exchange market, investors
Under Scottisih  bankruptcy law, owner liability  with less personal fixed wealth will outbid those with
extended to both personal and inheritable wealth. This  greater wealth, so the value of double liabilitv could
intergenerational extension of liability expanded the  collapse over time, creating a role for supervisors to
bank creditors' safety net.  ensure that only credible bidders are allowed.
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TableBank owner contingent  liability  has been  an important  component  in the developmental  history of many
industrial  countries.  For example,  Scotland  imposed  unlimited  liability  on bank owners  until 1862,  when
banks  were allowed  to adopt  a limited liability  designation.  As a result,  Scotland  was relatively  free of
the banking  and monetary  upheavals  that occurred  in Britain  and the United States.  In addition,  the
United States  conducted  a long regulatory  experiment  with double  liability,  which started  with the "free
banking"  movement  in the early 1900s  and was phased  out as part of the post-Depression  reforms  of the
1930s.
Thus some form of contingent  liability  has been  seen in the development  of many  industrial
countries,  suggesting  that contingent  liability  systems  might  play an important  policy role for many
developing  countries.  This chapter  traces  the history  of contingent  liability in banking,  with particular
emphasis  on Scotland  and the United  States.  We discuss  the potential  advantages  of contingent  liability
in a developing-country  context  as well as theoretical  weaknesses  and possible  solutions.
We also argue  that double  liability  and deposit  insurance  are not incompatible  regulatory
policies, even  though federal  deposit  insurance  was legislated  in 1933  to replace  double liability.  In fact
they coexisted  prior to 1933-ational  bank notes carried  a federal  guarantee  against loss at redemption.
Further,  in 1991  the Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Improvement  Act (FDICIA)  legislated  an
early  closure  rule that was meant  to impose  greater  regulatory  discipline  by enabling  postclosure  losses
on bank stockholders,  much  as with double  liability.Unlimited Liability and Free Banking in Scotland
White (1984) provides an extensive analysis of the history of unlimited liability in Scotland in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. During this period Scottish banking featured a "free banking"
approach with unregulated entry and a universal right to issue bank notes. In addition, unlimited liability
to bank creditors was imposed on bank stockholders. Also during this period Scotland lacked a central
bank, a national monetary policy, and formal bank supervision. Nonetheless, the economy developed
from a largely agrarian to an industrial economy, without suffering the monetary upheavals and bank
panics that characterized other developing countries at the time, such as Britain and the United States.
Unlimited liability of bank owners was an important element in the success of Scottish banking.
The unlimited liability rule lasted until 1862, when banks were allowed to adopt limited liability.
Throughout the first half of this history bank notes were the predominant form of bank liability, with
deposit banking gaining in importance only as disposable income grew.
The unlimited liability provision effectively minimized the losses suffered by bank noteholders
and other creditors. White (1984:41) reports that actual losses from Scottish bank failures were well
below those suffered by bank creditors in England. In addition, Scottish banks were not prone to the bank
runs and contagion effects that characterized British and U.S. banks at the time. Apparently, Scottish
note holders had little incentive to "run" because of the effective coverage provided by unlimited
liability. Scottish banks further reduced potential postclosure losses through branch banking and
clearinghouse arrangements and through the lack of reserve pyramiding, which minimized spill-over
effects. The low incidence of spill-over effects fostered competition among banks for the business of
failed banks. Therefore the recycling of failed bank liabilities (that is, bank notes) was efficient, and the
impact on the national money supply was minimized.
2Three key factors were vital to the success of unlimited liability in Scotland. First, the identities
of bank owners were made publicly available, and their level of wealth could be verified. Therefore the
degree of noteholder protection from unlimited liability could be assessed by aggregating individual
owner wealth. Second, under Scottish bankruptcy law bank owner liability extended to both personal and
inheritable wealth. This intergenerational extension of liability expanded the safety net to bank creditors.
Finally, the transfer of ownership claims in private and provincial banks required that ownership
first be dissolved before a new bank could be formed. This provision allowed the transfer of control to be
monitored, minimizing adverse selection problems that might arise if ownership was transferred to
people that held less personal wealth.
Double Liability in the United States
Under double liability bank stockholders could lose twice on their bank investment. First, contributed
capital was lost if the bank failed. Second, after a bank failure stockholders could be assessed up to the
par value of their shares to satisfy creditor claims. The par value of extended liability was the "double"
liability that bank stockholders faced. Initially, double liability was thought to provide adequate
protection to bank creditors to cover most of their potential losses. Double liability became increasingly
common in many states after 1837.
Bank Chartering
Bank chartering in the new U.S. confederation began with the Bank of North America in Philadelphia,
which was granted a perpetual charter in 1782 by the Continental Congress. The bank also issued the
confederacy's first circulating.  paper money. Chartered banking subsequently developed rapidly, with
3charters granted to the Massachusetts Bank (Boston) in 1784, the Bank of New York (New York City) in
1784, and the Bank of Maryland (Baltimore) in 1790.
During this early period in U.S. history banks were chartered by special legislative grants from
individual states and the federal Congress. Charters were granted in limited supply and only by the
chartering authority. This policy restricted access to banking in comparison to the free banking policies
of Scotland. Bank charters were effectively grants of monopoly rights, which bank owners often
protected by attempting to preclude the establishment of new banks in their area. Consequently, bank
chartering became highly politicized, and in turn motivated the free banking movement in the early
1830s.
Valuable charters allowed banks to generate profits without excessive risk-taking, which gave
banks an incentive to keep capital and reserve levels high to prevent regulatory loss of their charter.
Saunders and Wilson (1995) call the resulting positive relationship between bank capital and charter
value the "charter value hypothesis." Keeley (1990) provides evidence linking declining capital ratios to
declining U.S. bank charter values since the 1960s, which, in turn, was linked to the deregulation of
interstate banking restrictions. The conservative banking style induced by positive charter values also
protected bank noteholders and other creditors from potential loss, much as unlimited liability did in
Scotland at this time.
Free Banking
Free banking in the United States originated in Michigan in 1837 and New York in 1938. One goal of
this movement was to de-politicize the bank chartering process by allowing relatively free entry into
banking. With entry came a large increase in the number of banks and greater competition among banks,
allowing profits from banking to be shared more widely.
4The increase in competition and erosion of charter values lowered incentives for banks to
conservatively manage risk. "Wild cat" banking practices developed. Thus, it is not surprising that
double liability had its roots in the free-banking period. Double liability offered bank creditors greater
protection from loss and gave bank owners incentives to control risk-taking.
Several important features distinguished double liability from the unlimited liability practiced in
Scotland. First, under double liability bank stock was, for the most part, freely traded by auction and by
dealers in the United States, although many states required stockholders to be state residents (Klebaner
1992:14).
Second, stockholder liability was generally pro rata, implying that individual stockholders were
not liable for the assessment shortfalls of other stockholders and were released from liability once their
double liability was satisfied. This provision protected bank owners from each other, but lessened the
incentives for bank owners to monitor other owners' wvealthi.  The pro rata provision also made ownership
claims more freely transferable, which created potential adverse selection problems.
Vational Banking Era
Double liability was adopted for national banks when the National Banking Act of 1863 created a
national banking system. The double liability provision was modeled on state statutes, and its adoption
for national banks spurred further adoption by individual states. By 1930 only ten states had not adopted
some variation of double liability. Colorado had adopted triple liability, and Califonia  banks were
subject to unlimited liability.
During this period double liability coexisted with a federal guarantee of national bank notes.
Bank notes were the predominate liability of national banks, much as in Scotland. Issuing banks were
required to hold eligible Treasury bonds with the comptroller of the currency as collateral against their
5note issue. If the bank failed and was closed, the comptroller would then pay off bank notes at par value,
using the bonds held from that bank to satisfy claims. In addition, double liability assessments would be
made against bank stockholders to defray any residual claims. Therefore, double liability and a federal
guarantee of bank notes were used jointly to satisfy creditors. (In Scotland unlimited liability alone
generally provided sufficient protection for bank liability holders.)
Although bank notes were the predominate form of bank liability during this period, deposit
banking grew in importance, particularly as federal reserve notes replaced circulating bank notes after
the  creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1914. By the early 1930s deposits were the predominate
type of bank liability. But depositors did not have the federal guarantee extended to bank noteholders,
and therefore were only covered by double liability protection if the bank failed. As a final note, banks
did hold collateral in the form of bonds against goveniment deposits, which effectively made
government deposit claims senior to general depositors.
The End of Double Liability
The early 1930s witnessed the most severe banking and economic crisis in U.S. history. By 1933 most
regulators realized that double liability had failed to protect depositors and foster a stable banking
system. The federal guarantee afforded national bank notes had not been extended to depositors, despite
several attempts to legislate federal deposit insurance since the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.
Accordingly, double liability was phased out and replaced by federal deposit insurance of bank
deposits. The Banking Act of 1933 repealed double liability for all new common stock issues of national
banks. The Banking Act of 1935 repealed double liability on existing shares of stock held by national
banks as long as depositors were given six-months notice. States followed suit in repealing their own
double liability statutes.
6Double liability was abandoned for at least three reasons. First, it had failed to prevent bank runs
and spill-over effects and provide banking stability, particularly during the 1930s. Second, double
liability made recapitalization difficult during the 1930s. Previous panics were shorter and economic
recovery occurred sooner, making recapitalization easier. The length of the recession in the 1930s and
the nationwide scope of the banking crisis made bank stock that carried double liability difficult to issue.
Therefore, double liability relief made sense at least temporarily, in that banks could recapitalize.
Finally, it was felt that the double coverage of both federal deposit insurance and double liability xvas
unnecessary, even though a form of double coverage-the  federal guarantee of national bank notes-had
existed earlier.
Advantages  of Contingent  Liability  Systems
A contingent liability system has three advantages. First, because double liability imposes postclosure
losses on bank stockholders, it increases incentives for banks to hold capital and decreases moral hazard
incentives, such as a "go for broke" strategy. Second, a contingent liability system can ameliorate
asymmetric information problems between bank creditors and bank owners. Third, contingent liability
can lead to more-efficient capital formation if potential capital sources are predominately in the form of
fixed wealthi,  which is the case in many developing countries.
Amelioration of Moral Hazard Incentives
Banking systems operating under limited liability can be plagued by moral hazard problems and "go for
broke" incentives, as shown by the large losses with the thrift crisis during the early  1  980s. In contrast,
the postclosure losses imposed under a contingent liability system (such as double liability) give banks,
particularly financially distressed banks, incentives to hold more capital and to control risk-taking.
7There is some evidence that double liability fostered a more conservative banking system.
Macey and Miller (1992) argue that voluntary liquidation by banks was more common during the double
liability period and minimized depositor and stockholder losses. In contrast, the current U.S. system of
limited liability and fixed-rate deposit insurance gives bank stockholders fewer incentives to liquidate
voluntarily, and the FDIC has become the major vehicle for recycling failed bank assets.
For example, between 1863 and 1912 there were 525 bank closures and 2,357 voluntary
liquidations, indicating a high rate of asset recycling before bank failure occurred. Between 1913 and
1928 there were 125 national bank failures and 2,072 voluntary liquidations. Finally, during 1929-33
there were 1,280 national bank failures and 1,343 voluntary liquidations. These numbers suggest that
bank failures might have been much more prevalent during the Great Depression without double
liability.
Losses to national bank depositors during the double liability period averaged only 44 cents per
thousand dollars of deposits (Macey and Miller 1992). In contrast, FDIC losses in 1985 equaled
approximately $ 1.20 per thousand dollars of bank deposits. Therefore, losses during the double liability
period were fairly conservative.
Sozurces  ofBank Afanagement Discipline
As argued above, double and unlimited liability increased regulatory discipline on banks by imposing
postfailure losses on bank stockholders. In addition, bank depositors and other creditors exerted
discipline on bank management by requiring risk-based premiums for deposits and making the ominous
bank run threat. But because liquidating bank assets to quell a bank run was potentially costly, bank runs
could even threaten the solvency of solvent banks.
8Both depositors and stockholders were sources of management discipline. An asymmetric
information problem could arise between these groups. Typically, most bank depositors were thought to
be uninformed about the true solvency of the bank. These uninformed depositors based withdrawal
decisions on imperfect signals of bank solvency, such as long withdrawal lines. In contrast, informed
depositors, such as large corporate depositors, could quickly withdraw funds if bank solvency was
threatened. Because of this information asymmetry, double liability imposed the greatest threat of loss on
those stakeholders most informed about the bank's condition-the  stockholders.
One goal of federal deposit insurance in 1933 was to protect and stand in for uninformed
depositors by limiting initial deposit insurance coverage to $5,000. But because the rate charged to banks
for deposit insurance coverage was fixed (non-risk based), it introduced the well-known moral hazard
problem of deposit insurance. Arguably, if double liability had been retained as a complement to federal
deposit insurance, the regulatory discipline of double liability would have offset the moral hazard
incentives introduced with deposit insurance. Indeed, double liability had coexisted with the blanket
federal guarantee of national bank notes without the moral hazard problems that arose in the 1980s with
deposit insurance.
Capital Formation Advantages
Contingent liability may allow more efficient capital formulation in developing countries if capital is
mostly fixed wealth. In this case contingent liability can be viewed as a form of off-balance  sheet capital
(for example, land and other fixed assets), available to creditors if the bank closes. Arguably, off-
balance sheet capital may be of equal or greater value to liability holders compared with on-balance
sheet capital for several reasons. First, book asset values may not accurately reflect market asset values,
while off-balance  sheet capital may be easier to value. In addition, off-balance  sheet capital may be of
9highier  quality than on-balance  sheet capital if its value is less volatile. Finally, off-balance sheet capital
may diversify the bank's asset portfolio and thereby reduce expected creditor losses.
Allowing part of a bank's capital to be held off-balance sheet may have other advantages.
Because wealth in many developing countries is locked up as fixed assets, capital formation may be
difficult and costly in that it would require costly liquidation of fixed assets, which would reduce
available on-balance  sheet capital. Therefore double liability enables a more efficient use of assets to
form capital and attract depositors. Winton (1993) presents a formal proof of these assertions.
Free-Rider  and Adverse Selection Problems
Despite the advantages discussed above, contingent liability systems are also prone to adverse selection
and moral hazard problems.
Stockholders' efforts to monitor management increases the equity value of the bank by
increasing manager discipline. In addition, contingent liability increases the value of monitoring
management performance. But because of decreasing retumrs  to scale, monitoring incentives are greatest
for the wealthiest stockholders. A free-rider problem thus arises in that less-wealthy stockholders will
rely on the monitoring efforts of wealthier stockholders, who then bear the monitoring expense.
An adverse selection problem also arises when ownership claims can be freely and anonymously
traded. Ownership claims have greater value to investors with less personal wealth because they have
less to lose if the bank fails. In a free and anonymous exchange market investors withi  less personal fixed
wealth will outbid those with greater wealth, and consequently the value of double liability will collapse
through time. Eventually, the bank stock will be owned by investors with no fixed wealth, and double
liability will erode to limited liability.
10Furthermore, bank creditors have incentives to monitor the erosion of double liability. As erosion
occurs, creditors will demand higher premiums as compensation for bearing greater risk. Ultimately, the
erosion of double liability and the cost of higher premiums are born by owners who do not sell their
claims. A transfer of wealth is thus created from nonselling to selling owners, giving rise to incentives to
regulate ownership transfer.
Transferring ownership claims in Scotland required that the entire partnership be dissolved and
then reformed. Dissolving the partnership allowed new owners to be evaluated and either approved or
disapproved. In addition, the unlimited liability did not fully transfer with the change in ownership.
Selling owners remained liable for a period after ownership transfer. These devices helped to prevent
adverse selection problems and the erosion of unlimited liability protection.
In contrast, in the United States bank ownership shares could be freely and anonymously traded.
But other devices were potentially useful for preventing erosion of the double liability claim. For
example, bank stock during this period was relatively expensive compared with current bank stock
prices, particularly when adjusting for inflation. Typical bank stock prices ranged from hundreds of
dollars to thousands of dollars per share. In contrast, current U.S. bank stock prices range from $20 to
$40. These high prices restricted bank ownership to wealthy individuals.
In addition, during this period bank stocks were thinly traded with large bid-ask spreads,
implying that ownership claims were relatively expensive to trade. Bid-ask spreads in the range of 10 to
30 percent were common, implying that owners sold at, for example, a 30 percent discount relative to
buyers, with the spread paying for inventory and transaction costs of the broker.
Because of high underwriting and other issue costs, most new stock issues took the formn  of
subscription rights to current bank stockholders. Rights offers tended to further concentrate ownership
11with current stockholders. Finally, many banks served as their own transfer agents and maintained
stockholder lists. Therefore, ownership information was readily available to bank insiders.
There were thus implicit restrictions on ownership transfer during the double liability period, in
terms of high stock prices and high bid-ask spreads. Rights offers also tended to keep ownership
concentrated. As a result, banks tended to be closely held, with bank management also serving as major
stockholders. The benefits of being closely held were seen in reduced agency costs.
Empirical Results
Saunders and Wilson (1995) examined two measures of bank performance: the market-capital ratio-the
ratio of market equity value (price per share times the number of shares) divided by the market value of
assets (market equity value plus book value of debt)-and  bank charter value-the  ratio of the market
value of assets to the book value of assets-which  reflects expected future monopoly rents (table 6. 1).
Capital ratios were approximately twice as high prior to 1933, when double liability was
imposed, than after 1933. These high capital ratios reflected both the market discipline imposed by
uninsured depositors and that imposed by stockholders under double liability. The reason for the decline
in capital ratios after 1933 is somewhat ambiguous, since the reforms of the 1930s included both the
repeal of double liability and the advent of deposit insurance, as well as a host of other reforms such as
the Glass-Steagall Act.
Comparing the peak charter value measures both prior to and after deposit insurance, we see an
overall decline. Therefore the regulatory costs of double liability and the limitations faced by banks
during this earlier period, such as high underwriting costs, did not adversely affect their estimated charter
values.
12Finally, Saunders and Wilson (1995) find that the decline in bank capital ratios after the 193  Os
was, for the most part, not linked to the decline in charter values during this period. The authors theorize
that the change in incentives with the elimination of double liability and advent of federal deposit
insurance had a larger impact on bank capital structure decisions.
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